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do we get from unreflected absorption to reflected opinion? Hints as to how to get there 
I am sure will be welcome especially to students who plan to use fiction in their future 
classes but maybe also helpful for academic teachers who look for attractive examples 
for university classes but are afraid of seeming too shallow if they adopt bits of main-
stream public culture.
The discussions in the volume also lack a stronger degree of media awareness. 
Arguably there is a difference between a story read and a story seen. It would be inter-
esting to have a discussion about how to consume values through fiction in different 
media. An exception to this is the second last essay in the volume by Martha Rainbolt. 
She discusses the neglect of the ethical motives of Katniss Everdeen in the movies based 
on the Hunger Game series in comparison to the original books by Suzanne Collins. To 
me this seems an excellent starting point for raising media awareness: What happens to 
a story once it is adapted for the screen? Is ethical simplification a necessary feature of 
this transfer? Or can it be done otherwise?
This volume offers many ideas about the passing on of some of our most valuable 
thoughts that deserve wide discussion not only among teachers looking for books to 
read in class but also – and maybe even more so – among moral philosophers who tend 
not to think so much about the developing intellect of children and teenagers, but 
address rather the fully-fledged imago of brains that are open to nothing but arguments 
and ready to criticize them. 
Claudia Mill’s volume encourages us to look for ethics in unknown places – like 
children’s literature.
Barbara Reiter
Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
David Palmer (ed.). Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 235 pp. 
A book title Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates may be misleading for the 
potential reader due to two different sets of reasons. On one hand, the book is not about 
libertarianism in the more common political sense, i.e. “[...] the view that justice accords 
priority to respect for a wide range of basic liberties” (4, note 2) as in, let us say, Locke, 
or Nozick, or Valentyne. On the other hand, it is not a survey of the question of liberty 
as liberum arbitrium in recent analytical theory, but a homage book intended to discuss 
– Robert Kane’s ideas about free will and moral responsibility (4).
Following an introduction by David Palmer, the book consists of five parts. Part 
I – “Libertarian Theories of Free Will” deals with metaphysical problems related to 
liberty and determinism. Parts II – “The Luck Objection” and (III) “Incompatibilism 
and Omissions” both address some moral issues and consequences of free will, namely 
the ‘luck’ factor in human action; the question of ultimate moral responsibility in a world 
of fate, and how much human beings share the burdens of responsibility by ‘omission’. 
Part IV – “The Significance of Free Will” is among the more promising (more below). 
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Since the book is in fact about Robert Kane’s theories, he replies to his critics in a final 
part, a single chapter. 
However, in spite of our initial warning, the title turns out not to be entirely mis-
leading, even for those merely interested in political theory, since there is an obvious 
connection. If free will is just an illusion, that is, if our genetic constitution, the environ-
ment, fate, or God (181) are the real causes of our behaviour and we do not act freely, 
the political case for the respect of basic freedoms is severely weakened – it makes no 
sense to attempt to reduce our constraints to agency if one assumes we are completely 
predisposed by external or internal factors. In this sense, some kind of real moral 
responsibility – or in Kane’s formulation an ‘Ultimate Responsibility’ (UR) in the self-
formation of our actions (SFA) – is relevant to libertarianism in politics. Nor is the 
ambitious subtitle, ‘Contemporary Debates’, just a disguise for a Festschrift either, because 
the editor (David Palmer) has in fact been able to gather contributions from some of 
the best minds in the field. Moreover, the contributors go far beyond a mere analysis 
of Kane’s ideas. The book does not really cover new ground, but certainly makes an 
excellent entry point, in a readable style and without concessions to superficiality.
The central question, as David Palmer states in the introduction, is an ancient one, 
free will, “a central topic in philosophy” (3), often “maligned” (4). The basic puzzle is 
this: is causal determinism compatible with free will and moral responsibility? Ayer, in 
his 1954 Philosophical Essays (chapter 12) formulated the puzzle as follows: “When I am 
said to have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could have acted 
otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am 
held to be morally responsible for what I have done. For a man is not thought to be 
morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid. But if human 
behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any action that is done 
could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he would have acted 
otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they being what they were, 
it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did. Now it is commonly assumed 
both that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that is required to make them 
morally responsible, and that human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws: and 
it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions that gives rise to the philo-
sophical problem of the freedom of the will” (Ayer later changed or nuanced his view). 
It may seem clear, then, that we may embrace one or the other, but not both. Libertar-
ians embrace free will and moral responsibility.
Kane is an hard-boiled ‘incompatibilists’, that is, he upholds the view that agents 
are ultimately free and morally responsible and that free will and moral responsibility 
are incompatible with causal determinism (as any libertarian should be, but things some-
times get blurred). Kane is among those responsible for the resurgence of libertarianism 
as a topic in ontology, in works since his Free Will and values (1985) to the more recent 
The Significance of Free Will (1996), although he is more than an initiator, because he never 
stopped his reflections on the subject. Kane’s central idea is that “ethos mediates action” 
(181). Not all of our actions are free, but even so – according to Kane’s theory – we are 
morally responsible when – torn between contrary options – we make an effort to 
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 perform one of the options presented to us and we perform a ‘self-forming action’ 
(SFA). Such effort would be causally undetermined, and despite many constraints the 
agents’ previous SFA would make them Ultimately Responsible for their fundamental 
life choices. Human beings are more than puppets of fate, and the answer to better 
understanding this phenomenon may lie, as Kane puts it, in the reality of ‘effort’.
Kane himself describes the landscape when he approached the field: If you believe 
in science, either you find some form of ‘compatibilism’ between free human action and 
a world of deterministic causality, or you end up as a ‘hard determinist’, discarding free 
will entirely. On the other hand, if you uphold free will you are condemned to appeal 
to ‘metaphysics’ (180). Kane’s project may be defined as an attempt to ‘give an intel-
lectual account of free will’ without resorting to hocus pocus metaphysical entities such as 
chance or mystery. On the other hand, Kane is a staunch defender of event causation. 
Let us centre this review into two dimensions: metaphysical doubts and moral problems.
Carl Ginet criticizes Kane’s account of event-causation by free will suggesting a 
different ‘non-causal’ account – upholding that free choices are completely uncaused 
– which corresponds better to phenomenology of ‘competing efforts’ and provides a 
better response to the luck objection (that is, if all choices are undetermined, they are 
just a matter of luck without moral value). Timothy O’Connor argues that those who 
believe in free will should reject ‘physicalist’ explanations of the mind and endorse a 
non-reductionist “neo-Aristotelian causal powers account” (32) of causation in which 
substances or agents appear as the real causes, rather than events, preventing the “prob-
lem of the disappearing agent” (34) Alfred Mele argues that the dual efforts approach 
is insufficient to overcome the luck objection. Mele suggests that indeterminism does 
not imply a higher degree of control than that which determined agents could possess, 
but allows for a kind of control that cannot be put on a scale.
John Martin Fischer proposes a different answer to the luck objection suggesting 
that – in an indeterministic scenario represented by a machine – the connection between 
an agent’s mental states and choice is sufficient to make choice not as lucky as we could 
assume. Mackenna raises doubts about the soundness of Kane’s analyses of UR pointing 
out that compatibilists grant that “the source of an agent’s act be within her” (85), but 
do not think this is inimical to furthers sources “of what’s within her for which [she] is 
not also ultimately responsible” (85). Widerker and Schnall suggest that only through ad 
hoc hypothesis can compatibilists restrict Transfer Non-Responsibility (N-R) to include 
compatibilist intuitions. Randolph Clarke maintains that in some cases we are respon-
sible for an omission, not taken as a special case of actions and he concludes that one 
can have basic (non-derivative) responsibility for omissions as well as actions.
Far more interesting than all these attempts to fine tune incompatibility claims is 
the last section of the book. Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom present a thoughtful 
discussion of what free agency and an indeterministic source of actions add to make 
them valuable. Both assert that value and meaning can be achieved without indetermin-
ism, and engage in a kind of dialogue among them with arguments and objections. 
In previous works, Robert Kane lists a set of values that confer meaning to human 
actions and human life: genuine creativity, autonomy, merit, moral responsibility (UR); 
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capacity for wonder, resentment, indignation; dignity of values, unique sense of indi-
viduality; hope, open future; genuine love and friendship, and free action. This enu-
meration, far from exhaustive, make us recall Isaiah Berlin’s unsurpassed account of the 
amount and significance of the changes in our view of human affairs, praiseworthy and 
blameworthy actions, depending on free will.
In the end of the volume, Kane provides an important discussion of the essays. . 
We will only emphasize that against the phenomenological implausibility objection, 
Kane clarifies that, in his account of SFAs, he does not assert that agents have introspec-
tive awareness of making competing efforts. His account deals with what is going on 
“[...] behind the scenes when we exercise such a free will, not merely a description of 
what we immediately experience” (197). Kane claims that (incompatibilist) freedom is 
gained gradually through (compatibilist) control over the competing efforts in such a 
way that by self-forming actions we become ultimately responsible for our own lives.
How plausible are Kane’s theories, asks Palmer (4)? Let us opine: not much 
(cf. 181, 184). Kane assumes since his 1996 book some kind of “indeterminacy in our 
neural processes” (193). His hypothesis is that maybe, in moments of effort or neuro-
logical stress, free will can take over and command the brain. He suggests that five steps 
are necessary to move away from determinism (193-195; obviously the same indetermi-
nacy of the nerves of the hand must be involved [194], allowing us the power to act).
Kane still tries to discard the philosophy of conscience (197), fearing some kind of 
theological interference (200) or ‘uncaused’ factors (201), upholding instead agent causa-
tion (a ‘sui generis cause’ nonetheless).
How does he know what goes on behind the scenes? In the end, it seems that Kane 
cannot avoid dualism (203) and is prey of what Gilbert Ryle describes in his famous 
introduction to The Concept of the Mind as the ‘official doctrine’: “With the doubtful excep-
tions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. Some 
would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind. His body and his 
mind are ordinarily harnessed together [...]. Human bodies are in space and are subject 
to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space. Bodily processes and states 
can be inspected by external observers. So a man’s bodily life is as much a public affair 
as are the lives of animals and reptiles and even as the careers of trees, crystals and plan-
ets. But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The 
workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private. Only 
I can take direct cognisance of the states and processes of my own mind” (????).
Causal indeterminism does not solve the problem of the separation of ‘substances’: 
mind or self and brain. An analogue attempt was made by Karl Popper and John Eccles 
– and the later had knowledge of the ‘neurological’ processes which was not based on 
‘logical’ assumptions. Notwithstanding, in Objective Knowledge (chapter 2), Popper notes 
when reasoning about the body-mind relation that many theories that try to overcome 
dualism end up defending some kind of monism (chapter 4). In Unended Quest (chapter 
39), he acknowledges that his alternative to dualism is not monism but a plurality of 
factors and, challenged in an interview, he even asserts that there is a ‘ghost in the 
machine’. 
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Overall, the essays in this book are interesting and very good. With the possible 
exception of O’Connor’s essay, however, they seem far too concerned with logical 
puzzles, and thus fail to make justice to Kane’s contribution to the main question in the 
larger picture. This is perhaps why, despite competent hands at work, they do not prop-
erly explore the riches of Kane’s suggestions concerning the connection between life’s 
meaning and free will.
José Colen
Minho University
Lucas Williams 
University of Chicago
Janusz salamon (ed.). Solidarity Beyond Borders: Ethics in a Globalising World. Lon-
don: Bloomsbury, 2015. 197 pp.
The world is shrinking. What are the ethical implications of globalisation and 
increased global interdependence? How can we construct a new relevant global ethics? 
What does global justice and global solidarity imply?
The aim of the anthology Solidarity Beyond Borders is to introduce the term solidarity 
into the discussion on globalisation and global ethics. It is potentially a fruitful idea where 
‘solidarity’ is used as a normative concept in different traditions, from the socialist workers 
movement to Catholic social teaching. And in between we find Solidarnosc in Poland.
The book is multidisciplinary and contains contributions from scholars in political 
philosophy, moral theology and religious ethics. Steinar Stjerno begins by defining soli-
darity and gives a historical overview of its uses in the labour movement, Catholic social 
teaching, Christian democracy and at the present in the European Union. Sebastiano 
Maffettoni discusses global justice, criticizes both cosmopolitanism and statism and 
argues in support of a third view he calls ‘liberal internationalism’. Anna Abram dis-
cusses how solidarity is connected to and dependent on moral imagination. Patrick 
Riordan discusses different conceptual aspects of solidarity and argues for political 
friendship as the core meaning of solidarity. Jerome Gellman gives a Jewish, Ebrahim 
Moosa a Muslim and Yang Guorong a Chinese perspective on solidarity. Gerald Beyer 
discusses if solidarity is possible in light of the latest findings in evolutionary biology. 
Charles Webel and Sofia Khaydari argue for a non-violent global ethics and finally 
Janusz Salamon discusses how the transformation of conflicting identity narratives could 
be a way to solve transnational conflicts.
In my review I will focus on some ideas in Stjerno’s, Abram’s, Beyer’s and Sal-
amon’s contributions. Stierno shows how solidarity was a key word for the European 
labour movement. Bernstein, for example, summarises Social Democratic values on a 
threefold basis; equality, solidarity and freedom. During the 1960s and 1970s, this idea 
was broadened to include solidarity with the Third World. (His insightful analyses con-
trast with the simplistic introduction to the book by Roger Scruton who dismisses the 
idea of solidarity in the socialist labour movement without relevant arguments.)
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